For whatever reason, we might think that contingent statements about the future have no determinate truth value. Aristotle, in De interpretatione IX, for instance, held that only those propositions about the future which are either necessarily true, or necessarily false, or 'predetermined' in some way have a determinate truth-value. This led Łukasiewicz in 1920 to construct a three-valued logic in an attempt to formalize Aristotle' Originally published in Analysis (Volume 64, No. 2, April 2004: 122-8 ). An extended version of this paper appears in chapter 3 of my A Future for Presentism (Oxford University Press, 2006) © Craig Bourne 2 We can see that the purely determinate entries match the tables of the classical two-valued system; thus, what needs justification are the other entries. Let us take negation to illustrate. We may treat indeterminateness as something to be resolved one way or the other: it will eventually be either true or false. Thus the truth-value of the negation of an indeterminate proposition must itself be indeterminate, since if the initial proposition could be resolved either way, so must its negation. This reasoning similarly justifies the '½' entries in the other tables. Now, this system works smoothly for most cases of future contingent statements. Suppose, for example, I say:
(1) Either I will drown my sorrows or I will buy a Ducati 916 motorcycle.
We would intuitively think that if both of the disjuncts are indeterminate, then the whole disjunction must be indeterminate. This is precisely the answer given by Łukasiewicz's truth-tables. However, the trouble begins when we consider cases where one disjunct is the negation of the other. For suppose I say,
Either I will buy a Ducati or I will not buy a Ducati.
Because there is no middle ground to be had -either I will or I will not buy a Ducati -we must agree that (2) is determinately true. The problem is that both disjuncts are future contingent propositions and therefore indeterminate; but then, according to Łukasiewicz's tables, the whole disjunction must be indeterminate. Łukasiewicz's system gives us the wrong answer.
But not only is the law of excluded middle (p~p) no longer a logical truth in this system, the law of non-contradiction (~(p&~p)) isn't either, for it too takes the value ½ when p = ½. Furthermore, this system cannot be the correct formalization of Aristotle either, since, as noted above, necessary truths such as (p~p) for Aristotle have the determinate value = true.
Originally published in Analysis (Volume 64, No. 2, April 2004: 122-8 But although this solution might initially appeal, it is not a satisfactory one. For we are left wondering why it is that such sentences have a privileged status in three-valued logic. What is so special about these sentences that Tooley feels warranted in holding them to be determinately true in order to draw the conclusion that the connectives in three-valued logic must therefore be non-truthfunctional? Certainly, they are logical truths in two-valued logic; they are true under all assignments Thus, we should take the second option: construct a different system to Łukasiewicz's. The following systems allow us to keep the connectives truth-functional, allow us to keep the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction as logical truths, they don't introduce a distinction between
Originally published in Analysis (Volume 64, No. 2, April 2004: 122-8 The justification for the ~(½) = 1 entry is as follows: given that p is indeterminate, then it isn't the case that p; so to say that it is not the case that p is clearly to say something true. Thus, there is no justification for holding that the negation of a proposition can only be true if that proposition is false, as in Łukasiewicz's system. Halldén (1949) uses these tables to develop systems for dealing with vagueness and the logic of nonsense; so it is a system that is well understood. Moreover, it is a three-valued system where the classical laws remain valid. However, there are serious disadvantages to the Bochvar truth-tables for our purposes. For if we adopt these truth-tables, why is it that under composition we lose indeterminate truth-values? There are good reasons for Bochvar's purposes why this occurs, but his concerns are not ours. For the purposes of constructing a plausible system for future contingents, as we saw in (1) above, we want certain compound sentences with indeterminate components to remain indeterminate. This is not the system for us.
However, the solution now is clear. As noted, it was the definition of '~' in Łukasiewicz's system that caused the trouble. But, as we have seen with (1), the rest of Łukasiewicz's system works well. So, if we construct a system based on these two desirable features, then the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle remain logical truths -and, moreover, fall out as natural consequences of intuitive independent reasoning, unlike with Tooley's reasoning -, and the truthvalues of molecular propositions remain intuitive. Thus, those who wish to keep hold of a nonbivalent logic for future contingents can do so plausibly without having to abandon those logical laws, by working with the following truth-tables: Some comment, however, is in order. Let F (read 'It will be the case that') be a future-tense operator on present-tense propositions. Take the proposition (3) Dr Foster will go to Gloucester and the proposition (4) Dr Foster will not go to Gloucester.
It may be thought if one assigns ½ to (3), then (4) Care must be taken, however, when analysing (4) if we require it to be the negation of (3). The incorrect analysis is where the future-tensed operator has wide scope over the present-tensed proposition:
(4 ) F~(Dr Foster goes to Gloucester).
The reason why this must be the incorrect analysis of the negation of (3) is clear: the present-tensed proposition that Dr Foster goes to Gloucester has a determinate truth-value -it is either true or false depending on whether there is a present fact that Dr Foster goes to Gloucester to make it true. The negation of this proposition -Dr Foster does not go to Gloucester -is likewise either determinately true or false. But because these propositions fall within the future-tensed operator, both (3*) and (4 ) as a whole have the value 'indeterminate'. Now, this does not destroy the law of excluded middle 8 because the future-tensed proposition (4 ), i.e., (4 ) taken as a whole, is not the negation of the future-tensed proposition (3*), i.e., (3*) taken as a whole -it matters not a jot that the embedded present-tensed proposition in (4 ) is the negation of the embedded present-tensed proposition in (3*).
We may as well represent (3*) as p and (4 ) as q to highlight the fact that the pair (3*) and (4 ) is no counterexample to (p ~p). The correct analysis of the negation of (3) is:
(4*) ~F(Dr Foster goes to Gloucester) which is of the form ~p, as required. It seems to me that (4*) clearly says something true, given that it isn't the case that p. But, of course, to say (4*) is true is not to say that Dr Foster won't go to
Gloucester. That would be to confuse (4*) with (4 ), which would be a howler: to say that it is not the case that p is not to say that q! Thus even if it turns out that Dr Foster does go to Gloucester, we should still be happy to assign truth to (4*). (It might still be misleading to assert the truth of (4*) because of scope ambiguity and the rest (see, e.g., Grice (1989: Part I) ), but this in no way invalidates my reasoning.)
This helps us deal with a slightly different problem. Consider:
Since (p ~p) falls within the future-tense operator, does this mean we should assign (5) which we should be happy to reject, since if we take q = ~p we can see (6) mistakenly equates (4 ) with (4*).
This system has recognisably classical features: from simple truth -table tests Słupecki's (1936) work) this system is not functionally complete. But the sorts of truth-functions that cannot be generated by the connectives of this system have no application anyway, and so can be ignored.
Thus, so long as Dr Foster doesn't fall into a muddle with the law of excluded middle, it is possible to have what my 'Aristotle' desires, namely a non-bivalent logic where classical laws remain intact. Thus it should really be this system and not Łukasiewicz's, as Prior (1953: 317) has it, which is known as the 'classical system of three-valued logic'. 
